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diminution in market value of the house; or 2) the cost
of repairs. If the prevailing party fails to choose among
alternatives, the court should render the judgment
affording the greatest recovery. Therefore, the court
reduced the judgment for actual damages by $100,000.

Court holds that anger and frustration are
not compensable
The Woodruffs appealed the deletion of the
award for mental anguish, but they failed to present
direct evidence at trial regarding the nature, duration,

and severity of this anguish. Thus, the court applied the
traditional "no evidence" standard to decide whether the
record supported a finding of a "high degree of mental
pain and distress" which could be compensable. The
supreme court found no direct evidence on the record
establishing that the Woodruffs suffered mental anguish
resulting from the flooding and therefore denied
recovery. In affirming and modifying the court of
appeals' judgment, the court ruled that the Woodruffs'
anger and frustration did not rise to a level of
compensable mental anguish and deleted damages for
DTPA claims, the Woodruff's attorneys' fees, and
double recovery.

Use of standard form does not preclude TILA
violation
by Jane Cady
In Shields v. Lefta, 888
ESupp. 894 (N.D. Hll. 1995), the
United State District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois ruled on
a class action suit alleging violations
of the Federal Truth In Lending Act
("TILA"). In ruling on the
defendant's motion to dismiss, the
court held that the defendant's use of
the Federal Reserve Board's model
disclosure form did not preclude it
from violating the TILA. Furthermore, the court held that the
placement of the service contract
price among nonnegotiable items
did not violate the TILA or the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deception Act ("CFA"). Therefore,
the defendant's motion to dismiss
was denied in part and granted in
part.

1995-1996

TILA requires creditors to
disclose financial
information
The purpose of the TILA is
to provide meaningful disclosure of
credit terms so consumers may
compare available credit terms; to
avoid the uninformed use of credit;
and to protect consumers against
inaccurate and unfair credit billing.
To achieve these goals, Congress
granted the Federal Reserve Board
authority to expand the legal
framework governing commerce in
credit by promulgating Regulation
Z. Regulation Z requires a creditor
to disclose certain information for
each transaction conducted. A
creditor must separately itemize the

amount a consumer finances for
each transaction and also identify
any other person it pays on behalf of
the consumer.
In this case, each class
member purchased a car from the
defendant , Lefta, Inc., and financed
the transaction through a motor
vehicle installment sales contract.
Each car buyer also purchased an
extended warranty or service
contract from the defendant. The
plaintiffs claimed that the defendant
inadequately revealed the costs
included in the installment sales
contract for two reasons. First, the
defendant listed the entire amount
charged to the plaintiffs for a
purchased service contract under the
category "Amount Paid to Others."
Second, the defendant placed the
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service contract prices amid costs
itemized as "License, Title and
Taxes."

The plaintiffs objected to
these practices for several reasons.
First, not all the money listed under
"Amount Paid to Others" actually
went to others. The dealership
retained a portion of the proceeds.
Second, the plaintiffs alleged
misrepresentation as to the specific
amount paid to the dealership versus
that rendered to others. Finally, the
information placed under "License,
Title and Taxes" appeared to be
nonnegotiable because of its
location on the form.
The defendants moved to
dismiss the action based on its
compliance with both the TILA and
Regulation Z. The defendant
reasoned that its use of model forms,
provided by the Federal Reserve
Board, precluded any fraud under
the TILA. However, the court found
that if information contained on
these forms was false, the use of the
form would not provide immunity.
Thus, the court held that the

plaintiffs had stated a cause of
action on this claim and denied the
motion to dismiss.
The court did, however,
dismiss the plaintiffs' claim of
misrepresentation of the service
contract price as nonnegotiable.
After examining the form and
regulations, it found no other place
to put the charges on the form; and
that the regulations expressly
authorized the defendant to list the
charges in that category. Therefore,
the court granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss this issue.

Illinois Consumer Fraud Act
broader than the TILA
The defendant also
challenged the plaintiffs' claim
under the CFA and alleged three
grounds for dismissal: claiming that
overcharging a consumer was not a
violation of the CFA; defendant's
compliance with TILA precluded a
finding of a violation of CFA; and
the plaintiffs' damage remedy was

too speculative to admit consideration.
The court found the
defendant's first argument inviable
because the plaintiff claimed
deception, not excessive price. This
constituted a cause of action since
the full amount of the money
earmarked for the service contract
went to a third party. Second, the
court determined that despite
defendant's compliance with the
TILA, the CFA may reach beyond
the TILA. Although a creditor's
compliance with Regulation Z
automatically comports agreement
with the TILA, this is not necessarily the case with the CFA. However,
in this case, the plaintiffs' claim
regarding misrepresentation of a
nonnegotiable item did not state a
claim, and therefore was dismissed.
Finally, the defendant argued that
damages claimed by the plaintiffs
were too speculative to warrant
consideration. However, the
defendant did not follow up on this
count and the court thereby dismissed it.

Housing authority is a "person" under state's
Consumer Fraud Act
by Dana Shannon
In Zorba Contractors,Inc. v. HousingAuth. of
Newark, 660 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1995), the appellate court of New Jersey held that a
housing authority is a "person" as defined by the New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act ("CFA"), section 56:8-1 to
56:8-20 of the New Jersey Revised Statutes.
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Housing authority seeks repair or
replacement of faulty roofing
The Housing Authority of the City of
Newark ("Authority"), a defendant in a multi-party
case, filed a third party action against three roofing
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